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Abstract: We suggest that the phenomenon of uncertainty monitoring in
nonhuman animals contributes richly to the conception of nonhuman an-
imals’ self-monitoring. We propose that uncertainty may play a role in the
emergence of new forms of behavior that are adaptive. We recommend
that Smith et al. determine the extent to which the uncertain response
transfers immediately to other test paradigms.
Smith et al. have offered those who do research with nonhuman
animals an invaluable tool: a method for ascertaining not just what
types of information subjects learn and retain, but also a measure
of how certain those subjects are about their knowledge state. De-
spite the contribution to the understanding of uncertainty moni-
toring in nonhuman organisms, there are some problems with the
current article, and we will discuss a few of these before noting
other contributions of the article. Clearly, the proportions of trials
on which the animals touched the box, the star, and the S with the
cursor, as depicted in Figure 3 (target article, sect. 6) and else-
where, are correct within errors of measurement. However, it
should be noted that the labels on the graphs are “Sparse,”
“Dense,” and “Uncertain” rather than “box,” “star,” and “S.” Al-
though the facts may be clear, they become “interpreted facts” (cf.
sect. 14.2) with great ease and without apparent recognition.
The interpretation of the responses is a major problem through-
out the manuscript in that the authors refer to the star response
as an uncertain response in some places and as declining the trial
in other places. This problem is associated with another problem
if the “declining the trial” interpretation is given. Specifically,
choosing the star, declining the trial, would seem to be a response
that should be paired with choosing some other symbol to indicate
that the trial is accepted. In particular, this is an implicit two-stage
decision situation. In the first stage, the organism either declines
the trial or accepts the trial. If the trial is accepted, then there is a
second stage in which the organism indicates that the stimulus is
dense or sparse. The analysis of a two-stage decision-making situ-
ation is different from an analysis of a single-stage decision-mak-
ing situation with three alternatives. If the star indicates uncer-
tainty, then the situation is a one-stage decision situation with
three alternatives (uncertain, sparse, dense). Given the emphasis
on uncertainty monitoring, it can be argued that the three-alter-
native interpretation is the appropriate one, and that the “declin-
ing the trial” interpretation is not germane to the issue of uncer-
tainty monitoring.
We propose that the uncertainty response exhibited by nonhu-
man animals may be important in what one of us (Rumbaugh) has
called emergents (Rumbaugh et al. 1996b; see also Rumbaugh
2002; Rumbaugh et al. 1996a). Emergent behaviors are new pat-
terns of responding with no antecedent in previously learned 
behavior. Emergent behaviors are applied appropriately to novel
situations. Perhaps uncertainty monitoring may lead to the pro-
duction of emergents. Emergents may occur at moments of un-
certainty when what has worked in the past will not work in the
present. As noted by Smith et al., uncertainty often promotes hes-
itation, and we are struck by the notion that what previously has
been called insight, which may be a subclass of emergents, often
is the outcome of such behavioral hesitation. For example, Köh-
ler (1925) described chimpanzees’ attempts to attain out-of-reach
foods before stopping, seemingly reassessing the situation, and
then arriving at the use of objects to reach those items. One could
imagine that the animals were uncertain about how to obtain the
foods, but they recognized that a correct solution must have been
available. Importantly, Rumbaugh et al. (1996b) noted that emer-
gents “generalize between contexts not on the basis of the specific
stimulus dimension, as in stimulus generalization, but rather on
the basis of relations between stimuli and/or rules” (p. 59).
This notion of the generalized use of appropriate responses is
an aspect of the Smith et al. uncertainty-monitoring paradigm not
yet established. By this we mean the following: Human beings’
subjective states of uncertainty are similar across situations. For
example, when we say that we are uncertain about a person’s
name, we mean almost exactly the same thing as when we say we
are uncertain of the exact time of day or the location of a given city.
In each of these cases, we know there is a correct answer, but we
also know that the answer that we would produce may not be the
correct answer. As such, the feeling of uncertainty is consistent
across situations. Although there may be differing levels of uncer-
tainty, we do not qualitatively redefine our feelings across the
above situations. Our question is whether nonhuman animals
would use the uncertain response on a variety of transfer tasks to
demonstrate that the response truly maps onto the same psycho-
logical state from the outset. Such transfer tests, in fact, would
demonstrate consistency across such objectively uncertain states
as could be produced by these tasks, but as yet, this is an unan-
swered question.
We agree with Smith et al. that there is no reason to assume that
the use of an uncertain response by nonhuman animals is not con-
sistent psychologically with the use of the same response by hu-
man participants. We also agree that when the objective state of
the world and the subjective state of the organism coincide suffi-
ciently, the organism relies on learned behavior. If, however, the
correspondence of those states is low, the organism may produce
novel responses to cope with the situation, and those novel re-
sponses may be emergents. Whether uncertainty monitoring pro-
vides information about consciousness, or working consciousness
(to use the Smith et al. term), is itself uncertain. But, we suggest
(along with Smith et al.) that the best possible description of un-
certainty monitoring should be based on the high level of behav-
ioral similarity between humans and nonhuman animals demon-
strated in these exciting studies.
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Abstract: When animals choose between completing a cognitive task and
“escaping,” proper interpretation of their behavior depends crucially on
methodological details, including how forced and freely chosen tests are
mixed and whether appropriate transfer tests are administered. But no
matter how rigorous the test, it is impossible to go beyond functional sim-
ilarity between human and nonhuman behaviors to certainty about hu-
man-like consciousness.
Devising nonverbal tests for processes normally accessed by ver-
bal report of conscious awareness in humans is one of the biggest
challenges in contemporary research on comparative cognition
(Shettleworth 1998). It is one of the biggest sources of controversy
as well. Many of the issues in the study of metacognition are also
evident in research on whether nonhuman animals have episodic
memory (Clayton et al. 2001), theory of mind (Heyes 1998), or are
capable of intentional deception (Kummer et al. 1996). The chal-
lenge is to devise experimental procedures to elicit behavior from
animals that is functionally similar to behavior accompanied by
distinctive mental states in humans. The term functional similar-
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